Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Absurdities and Oddiments: Matters of Law

FROM Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B. N. S. Int'’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

The following is excerpted from the written opinion of Judge Friendly:

The issue is, what is chicken? Plaintiff says '‘chicken' means a young chicken, suitable for broiling and frying. Defendant says 'chickenÂ' means any bird of that genus that meets contract specifications on weight and quality, including what it calls '‘stewing chicken' and plaintiff pejoratively terms 'fowl'’. Dictionaries give both meanings, as well as some others not relevant here. To support its, plaintiff sends a number of volleys over the net; defendant essays to return them and adds a few serves of its own. Assuming that both parties were acting in good faith, the case nicely illustrates Holmes’' remark 'that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs' —not on the parties 'having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.'’

Ah, weighty stuff! This was an historical decision.

But, actually, despite the absurd fact that a judicial decision hinges upon the question "what is a chicken?" I find it marvellously amazing (or vice versa) that the legal profession is able to deal so decisively with some of the headiest philosophical issues.

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